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Sraffa, Marshall and the principle of 
continuity
Nuno Ornelas Martins*
This article addresses Piero Sraffa’s critique of Alfred Marshall’s supply-and-
demand framework, and Sraffa’s later book Production of Commodities, taking into 
account an aspect that has been relatively neglected in the literature, namely the 
ontology underlying the conceptions of Sraffa and Marshall. This ontological dimen-
sion can be best understood through Sraffa’s critique of the principle of continuity. 
The principle of continuity was used by Marshall as a methodological justi#cation 
for the use of partial equilibrium methods in the analysis of supply and demand, in 
a context where different causes are deeply interconnected. Sraffa acknowledges the 
existence of interconnectedness, but rejects Marshall’s methodology, which is based 
on the principle of continuity, as it becomes clear in his unpublished manuscripts, 
which are examined here.
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1. Introduction1
The published writings of the Cambridge Italian economist Piero Sraffa have gener-
ated much controversy throughout the history of economic thought. There are two 
fundamental moments in the published writings of Sraffa. The #rst moment is Sraffa’s 
(1925, 1926) critique of Alfred Marshall’s neoclassical framework, and of the use of 
partial equilibrium analysis and its geometrical representation through supply-and-
demand diagrams. In the late 1920s, Sraffa came to interpret the classical political 
economists in a new light, which led to a long period until the second fundamen-
tal moment, when Sraffa #nally published Production of Commodities by Means of 
Commodities, in 1960.
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Page 2 of 20  N. O. Martins
Heinz Kurz and Neri Salvadori (2005) suggest that this change of Sraffa’s interpre-
tation of the classical authors was gradual, resulting from a reading of Marx in 1927 
and 1928. Pierangelo Garegnani (2005, p. 488), in contrast, argues that the change 
‘does not appear to have been gradual, but to have rather been a matter of months, 
if not weeks, early in the Autumn of 1927’. During this period, Sraffa developed the 
equations that would ultimately lead to his 1960 book and subsequently read (or 
reread) Marx in light of his new discovery. As Garegnani (2005) convincingly argues, 
this discovery created a dif#culty for Sraffa, who had agreed to lecture in Cambridge 
in October 1927 on the theory of value, a subject on which Sraffa was rapidly changing 
his mind towards a new interpretation following his discovery.
In the new interpretation Sraffa reaches after 1927, there is a clear distinction 
between two theories of value, which answer different types of questions. The differ-
ences between these two theories had been overlooked by Marshall (1920), who devel-
oped the supply-and-demand framework attempting also to make it compatible with 
the classical political economy of Smith and Ricardo, in what was termed neoclassical 
economics by Thorstein Veblen (1900), a perspective that would supposedly reconcile 
the new elements of marginalism with classical political economy.
For Marshall, the two theories of value, which Sraffa came to #nd irreconcilable and 
concerned with different questions, would be compatible. Following Marshall, there 
is a tendency to interpret classical political economy as an early form of neoclassical 
economics, i.e. as an endeavour that already presupposes a supply-and-demand frame-
work. Thus, Marshall (1920) argues that there is continuity in the history of economic 
thought, going through Smith, Ricardo and Mill to Marshall’s own contribution.
Note that Sraffa (D3/12/11/11) uses the term ‘principle of continuity’ to apply to 
time, to distinguish ‘long and short periods’, and as applied to matter and the ‘consid-
eration of the margins as in#nitesimals’. Marshall, in contrast, uses the term ‘continu-
ity’ to denote continuity in the history of economic thought. The expression ‘principle 
of continuity’ is used in this article in Sraffa’s sense, and not to denote continuity in 
the history of economic thought, which Marshall believes to exist between his work 
and that of the classicals.
While authors such as Jean-Baptiste Say, Thomas Robert Malthus and, later, John 
Stuart Mill may be seen as portraying an embryonic form of supply-and-demand 
analysis, the same cannot be said of Smith, Ricardo and Marx, according to Sraffa’s 
perspective of their standpoint. Sraffa interprets the perspective of Smith, Ricardo 
and Marx as one where the natural price (or price of production, to use Marx’s ter-
minology) can be found by studying the conditions of production without looking at 
demand.
A central question in this context concerns how the conditions of production deter-
mine the natural price (or price of production), which would then be the cornerstone of 
the classical perspective of Smith, Ricardo and Marx. Sraffa’s (1960) contribution can be 
seen as an attempt to achieve a satisfactory answer to this question, i.e. a theory of the 
way in which prices are determined by the process of production. In so doing, Sraffa is 
interpreting Smith, Ricardo, Marx and the classical political economists since Petty as 
being engaged in a very different project from Marshall’s supply-and-demand framework.
A crucial element, which ultimately led Sraffa to develop an alternative framework, 
is the principle of continuity, which is grounded on Marshall’s interpretation of the dif-
ferential calculus of Isaac Newton and its notion of continuous time, which is essential 
to Marshall’s partial equilibrium analysis and to the use of supply-and-demand curves 
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Sraffa, Marshall and the principle of continuity  Page 3 of 20
in Marshallian economics. The role of the principle of continuity in Sraffa’s critique 
has been relatively neglected in the literature or, at best, touched upon only brie%y—
e.g. by Kurz and Salvadori (2005, p. 85).
In the present article, Sraffa’s critique of Marshallian neoclassical economics and 
the interpretation of classical political economy Sraffa developed after 1927 will be 
assessed, taking into account Sraffa’s approach to the principle of continuity and to 
the notion of continuous time while drawing upon Sraffa’s unpublished papers at the 
Wren Library, Trinity College, Cambridge.
2. Natural prices, demand and supply
According to the view Sraffa developed after 1927, there are two fundamental theories 
of value, which answer different types of questions. For one of them, which became 
more prominent with authors like William Petty, Adam Smith and David Ricardo, 
there is an objective conception of value, where value depends upon the conditions of 
production that will determine the natural price. This is the framework that underlies 
classical political economy. Writing within this tradition, Smith de#nes effectual demand 
as the demand of those who are willing to pay the natural price; thus, effectual demand 
is not an independent concept from the natural price, for it is de#ned in terms of the 
natural price. That is, there is a sequential explanation of value, where conditions of 
production determine the natural price, which in turn is a necessary element to de#ne 
effectual demand. Sraffa’s (1960) contribution can be seen as a revival of this perspec-
tive, i.e. of classical political economy, as Ronald Meek (1961) argued.
For another perspective of value (which underpins neoclassical economics and became 
the dominant perspective after the marginalist revolution), prices are not explained in 
a sequential way (where the conditions of production determine natural prices and the 
latter are in turn a necessary element to de#ne effectual demand, as in classical politi-
cal economy). Rather, prices and quantities are determined mutually, by supply and 
demand, which are mutually independent factors. Thus, instead of having natural prices 
as an element used to de#ne effectual demand, demand is seen as an independent fac-
tor which, with supply, determines prices (and quantities).
The latter perspective, of mutual determination of prices and quantities, was devel-
oped and systematised by Alfred Marshall, who criticises William Stanley Jevons for 
adopting a sequential explanation of value. According to Marshall, Jevons resorts to a 
sequential framework where the cost of production determines supply, supply deter-
mines marginal utility (which Jevons, 1871, calls the ‘#nal degree of utility’) and mar-
ginal utility determines value. Commenting on Jevons’ perspective, Marshall writes:
the greatest objection of all to his formal statement of his central doctrine is that it does not rep-
resent supply price, demand price and amount produced as mutually determining one another 
(subject to certain other conditions), but as determined one by another in a series. It is as though 
when three balls A, B, and C rest against one another in a bowl, instead of saying that the posi-
tion of the three mutually determines one another under the action of gravity, he had said that 
A determines B, and B determines C. Someone else however with equal justice might say that C 
determines B and B determines A. (Marshall, 1920, p. 674)
This statement could also be aimed at the sequential interpretation of classical politi-
cal economy, where costs of production determine value (or natural prices) and the 
latter are a determinant of demand. But Marshall notes that Ricardo did not have 
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Page 4 of 20  N. O. Martins
the technical resources available to Jevons, which would enable a conceptualisation in 
terms of a mutual determination of prices and quantities, the one Marshall develops.
Also, Marshall believed that he developed his approach independently of Jevons. In 
Marshall’s early theory of value, demand (and supply) schedules are de#ned by look-
ing at how much each different individual is willing to pay (or to receive) for a given 
good; thus, we do not have a #nal (or marginal) degree of utility of a single individual 
(as for Jevons), but rather a ‘marginal agent’. Just like Smith when de#ning effectual 
demand, the early Marshall reasons not in terms of variations within the mind of a 
single individual, but in terms of variations between the prices different individuals are 
willing to pay.
In the Principles of Economics we already #nd Marshall (1920, p. 79) writing about 
the consumer at the ‘margin of doubt’, where the decision to buy depends on ‘the mar-
ginal utility of the thing to him’. But this comes after Marshall’s (1920, p. 77) remark 
that ‘much that is of chief interest in the science of wants, is borrowed from the science 
of efforts and activities’, and therefore the study of psychological phenomena is sub-
sidiary to a more general study of human activity. Thus, Gerald Shove (1942, p. 307) 
writes that ‘Marshall began with the objective demand and supply schedules, the phe-
nomena of the market place, and worked backwards from them to their psychological 
basis, not (as was the case with Jevons) the other way about’—see also Simon Cook 
(2009, pp. 178–9), who discusses this issue with reference to Marshall’s early essay ‘On 
Value’ and also refers to Shove’s quote.
Marshall’s perspective was thus not a simple reconciliation between classical politi-
cal economy (as systematised by Ricardo) and marginalism (as advanced by Jevons 
and others). Marshall was critical of Jevons’ sequential method and developed his own 
ideas on marginalism independently. Furthermore, as Shove notes, Marshall wrote, in 
a letter to J. B. Clark dated 24 March 1908:
One thing alone in American criticism irritates me, though it need not be unkindly meant. It is 
the suggestion that I try to ‘compromise between’ or ‘reconcile’ divergent schools of thought. 
(Marshall, as cited in Shove, 1942, p. 295)
And a reason why Marshall saw his contribution as a novel advance, rather than a 
reconciliation of what was done by others, lies in the fact that while others proposed a 
sequential determination of value, Marshall advanced a method of mutual determina-
tion of value.
This emphasis on mutual determination can be seen in light of Marshall’s philosoph-
ical perspective, where reality is seen as an interconnected whole. In fact, Marshall’s 
early philosophical perspective was strongly in%uenced by Friedrich Hegel, for whom 
all reality is a deeply interconnected whole, as Cook (2009) explains.
Peter Groenewegen (2011), criticising Cook’s (2009) position, argues that Marshall’s 
reading of Hegel was limited, because ‘Marshall ignored work by Hegel other than his 
Philosophy of History’ and ‘Marshall’s use of Hegel illustrates the manner in which he 
often used texts, altering their meaning to make them conform more to what he him-
self wanted to believe on the issue in question’, and lastly because ‘although speci#c 
use of Hegel by Marshall featured especially in work from the second half of the 1870s, 
and some of it occurred in the Principles of Economics, the in%uence of Hegel was some-
what loose and invariably minor’ (Groenewegen, 2011, p. 138).
Nevertheless, whatever is the case concerning Marshall’s Hegelianism, there is one 
aspect often identi#ed with Hegelianism that was certainly central for Marshall. This 
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is the idea that the whole is more than the sum of the parts. Bertrand Russell (1945) 
acknowledges this as a central (or maybe the central) aspect of Hegel’s philosophy, 
in order to then criticise this position, which was then gaining ground at Cambridge 
(at the time under the name of ‘internal relation’, i.e. a relation that is constitutive 
of the related entities, making the whole more than the sum of their parts). Geoffrey 
Harcourt (2003) identi#es the idea that the whole is more than the sum of the parts as 
the #rst of three key characteristics of the Cambridge economic tradition initiated by 
Marshall and absolutely central to Keynes’s revolution in approach.
3. Direct effects and indirect effects
Now, if the whole is more than the sum of the parts we can never understand com-
pletely a given part of reality, since by studying a given part we are always missing its 
relationships to the whole. Therefore, Marshall’s (1923) motto for his Industry and Trade, 
which appears also in Appendix C of Marshall’s Principles of Economics (Marshall, 1920, 
p. 641), is ‘the Many in the One, the One in the Many’, which signals the presence of 
many different in%uences in a given aspect of reality, which is however one uni#ed whole.
A problem that is raised by the presence of interconnectedness in a whole is how can 
any type of analysis proceed, since we are always limited to the study of parts of reality 
and can never grasp the whole as a whole—wholes ‘qua wholes’, to use John Maynard 
Keynes’ (1973, p. 277) famous expression, on which see Tony Lawson (2003). In his 
Industry and Trade, Marshall formulates the problem of interconnectedness as he sees it:
It was not till the seventeenth century that the physical sciences appreciated the full importance 
of the fact that when several causes act together and mutually affect one another, then each 
cause produces two classes of effects; those which are direct, and those which result indirectly 
from the in%uences exerted by it on other causes: for indeed these direct and indirect effects are 
apt to become so intricately interwoven that they can by no means be disentangled. (Marshall, 
1923 [1919], p. 677)
Marshall, however, provides the following solution to the problem, which will lead to 
Marshall’s partial equilibrium analysis:
But a way out of the dif#culty was found, chie%y under the guidance of Leibnitz and Newton. An 
epoch-making process of reasoning showed that, though the indirect effects might grow cumu-
latively, and ere long become considerable, yet at #rst they would be very small indeed relatively 
to the direct effects. Hence it was concluded that a study of the tendency to change, resulting 
from each several disturbing cause, might be made the starting point for a broad study of the 
in%uences of several causes acting together. (Marshall 1923 [1919], p. 677–8)
This separation between direct effects and indirect effects will be the cornerstone of 
Marshall’s partial equilibrium (or particular equilibrium) analysis, where we can ana-
lyse the direct effects of a change in a shorter period of time, knowing however that in 
a longer period of time the indirect effects will manifest themselves. And Marshall sees 
this methodology as being grounded on Leibniz and Newton.
The reliance on a Newtonian methodology is not unrelated to Marshall’s math-
ematical training in Cambridge. Mathematics in Cambridge was characterised by a 
Newtonian approach, where the emphasis was on geometrical and mechanical prob-
lems, rather than on symbolic algebra. The Cambridge mathematical environment did 
not maintain a strictly Newtonian approach to mathematics after 1815. But some 
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Page 6 of 20  N. O. Martins
elements of a Newtonian approach, such as the emphasis on geometry and a concern 
with practical (and mechanical) problems, survived in the Cambridge Mathematical 
Tripos undertaken by Marshall (see Cook, 2009).
In fact, a Newtonian approach to mathematics can be characterised as one where 
mathematics is grounded on geometry and concerned with practical (and mechani-
cal) problems. This approach contrasts with the Cartesian approach to mathemat-
ics, which was dominant in the European continent (and increasingly dominant in 
Cambridge during Marshall’s life), where mathematics is grounded on algebra and 
not necessarily concerned with practical problems. The latter is actually Leibniz’s 
own methodology; hence the differences between Newton’s geometrical approach 
and Leibniz’s algebraic approach to differential calculus (see Atiyah, 2005, pp. 654–7; 
Guicciardini, 2009).
But a common aspect of the methodologies of Newton and Leibniz is the principle 
of continuity. The principle of continuity appears also in the unpublished manuscripts 
of Henry Sidgwick (Add Msc 96/2)—who Marshall called his ‘spiritual father and 
mother’—where Sidgwick discusses the law of continuity of Leibniz. Marshall’s reli-
ance on Newton and Leibniz and the issue of continuity constitutes a general meth-
odology, which provides a justi#cation for the separation between direct effects and 
indirect effects:
If A is a state of things in%uenced by conditions B and C; while B and C are so connected that 
a change in B sets up simultaneous tendencies to change in both A and C; then the changes 
produced in A and in C will at #rst be very small, though they may increase continually and 
cumulatively. Now since the immediate effect which a considerable change in B exerts on C 
would be very small; the immediate effect which the change B exerts on A indirectly through a 
very small change made by it in C, must be a very small part of a very small thing (…) and be 
negligible provisionally. But yet its accumulated effects may need consideration in special cases. 
(Marshall, 1923 [1919], p. 678)
The separation between direct effects and indirect effects will thus be Marshall’s basis 
for economic analysis. Economic analysis can then focus on the direct effects of a 
change, which may be mathematically represented, using the differential calculus of 
Newton and Leibniz, as a #rst derivative. The indirect effects, which may be mathe-
matically represented, using the differential calculus of Newton and Leibniz, as second 
derivatives, have a smaller effect that only shows itself cumulatively as time goes by. So 
if we assume a period of time short enough so that only direct effects will take place, 
we can thus undertake partial (or particular) equilibrium analysis, which is the analysis 
of a given part of reality, while leaving indirect effects aside. Hence, in the short period 
we can look at a particular market using supply-and-demand curves, while assuming 
everything else (i.e. the ‘indirect effects’) to be negligible or constant—the pound of 
ceteris paribus.
4. Sraffa’s critique of partial equilibrium analysis
Sraffa was critical of Marshall’s use of supply-and-demand functions while assuming 
everything else constant. Sraffa’s critique was famously published in his 1925 and 
1926 articles. It is important to note that Sraffa’s critique is directed at the whole 
Marshallian tradition, which had been systematised by Arthur Cecil Pigou. This also 
means that Sraffa may also be reading much of Marshall through Pigou. In fact, 
 b
y
 g
u
est o
n
 F
eb
ru
ary
 3
, 2
0
1
3
h
ttp
://cje.o
x
fo
rd
jo
u
rn
als.o
rg
/
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 fro
m
 
Sraffa, Marshall and the principle of continuity  Page 7 of 20
to criticise Marshall himself would be a more dif#cult endeavour, since Marshall’s 
position is not always as clear and one-sided as it is sometimes depicted by the 
Marshallians.
But the debate concerning Sraffa’s (1925, 1926) critique of Marshall is based on 
Sraffa’s articles that were written before 1927, i.e. before the crucial turning point in 
Sraffa’s thinking identi#ed by Garegnani (2005). When Sraffa’s critique is revisited 
in the symposium that took place in 1930 in the Economic Journal (Robertson et al., 
1930), it is Dennis Robertson and Gerald Shove who defend the Marshallian tradition. 
In this exchange we #nd already a change of tone in Sraffa’s critique, which becomes 
much sharper than in the previous articles of 1925 and 1926, as Annalisa Rosselli 
(2005) notes.
The change of tone may also be due to the fact that Sraffa was already a more estab-
lished scholar after the 1925 and 1926 articles. But this change of tone is certainly not 
unrelated to Sraffa’s ‘rediscovery of the position of the “old Classical economists”, 
beyond the Marshallian interpretation he had hitherto followed’ (Garegnani, 2005, 
pp. 453–4). A sharper tone is also adopted by Sraffa (1932), when criticising Friedrich 
Hayek’s theory of capital. This supports the claim that Sraffa’s critique of all perspec-
tives informed by marginalism, from neoclassical economics to Austrian economics, 
was undertaken in a sharper tone after 1927, the time when he comes to see classical 
political economy in a radically different light, in which no reconciliation with margin-
alism was possible.
But there is a crucial methodological point for Sraffa’s critique of Marshall’s 
method, which becomes clear in Sraffa’s unpublished manuscripts. As Maria Cristina 
Marcuzzo and Annalisa Rosselli (2011, p. 10) note, Sraffa writes in the unpublished 
papers, concerning the ‘the nature of the curves of the marginal analysis’ that:
This is nothing less than a declaration of faith in universal determinism, for nothing less can 
support the belief in the actual existence of a prescribed path which must inevitably be followed, 
whether by the consumer or by the producer, such as is described by the demand—and sup-
ply—curves: for no observation, however minute, of the existing situation (in our case, of the 
existing methods of production) can bring out the path along which they must move in any given 
circumstances. (Sraffa, D3/12/46/52)
So, for Sraffa only, ‘faith in universal determinism’ can justify the belief that changes 
in the (demand or supply) curve will inevitably lead to the partial equilibrium prices as 
assumed by Marshall. Sraffa writes:
The fundamental fallacies in Marshall are:
The principle of substitution
The principle of continuity, in its two applications:
1) To time ‘long and short periods’
2) To matter, ‘consideration of the margins as in#nitesimals’
The metaphysics of utility-sacri#ce
His one great contribution is the intelligent application of Leibnitz and Newton analysis to eco-
nomics (Ind. and Trade, p. 677–8 text and note). (Sraffa, D3/12/11/11, original emphasis)
In this note from November 1927 (i.e. written during the ‘turning point’ identi-
#ed by Garegnani, 2005), we can see that Sraffa was aware of Marshall’s methodo-
logical justi#cation of partial equilibrium analysis given in Industry and Trade and 
the principle of continuity. In fact, Sraffa recognises that the use of the method of 
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Page 8 of 20  N. O. Martins
Leibniz and Newton is perhaps the greatest contribution of Marshall. However, 
Sraffa considers the principle of continuity as one of the great failings of Marshall, 
both in its application to time (and in the division between short and long periods) 
and in its application to in#nitesimals, in which Marshall draws upon Newton and 
Leibniz.
There are various reasons for Sraffa’s scepticism concerning the use of a Newtonian 
methodology. Sraffa (D3/12/42/9, #rst proposition) writes, in a note written in Italian, that 
Marshall’s adoption of Newton’s method is erroneous, noting that Newton did not have 
the dif#culty of having to assume an heterogeneous aggregate as being constant. Also, 
Sraffa points out how in the twentieth century Marshall could not rely on Newtonian 
mechanics unproblematically, referring to Erwin Schrödinger in this connection.
In fact, if Marshall’s partial equilibrium analysis was based on Newtonian mechan-
ics, this also meant that it was based on a conception of natural science that was being 
challenged by quantum physics, in which Sraffa was interested at the time. Heinz 
Kurz and Neri Salvadori (2005, p. 84) argue that ‘Sraffa … showed a particular inter-
est in quantum theory, championed by physicists such as Werner Heisenberg, Erwin 
Schrödinger and Paul Dirac.’ They continue:
Sraffa read and annotated P. W. Bridgman’s The Logic of Modern Physics (Bridgman, 1927) and 
referred to it in his papers. Quantum theory can be said to have brought about the greatest 
revision of thinking about the nature of the physical world since the days of Isaac Newton and 
constituted a revolution in our understanding of physical processes and beyond. What was to 
be learned from it in economics and did this have implications for the received marginalist 
doctrine? As several notes and manuscripts written over a long period of time show, Sraffa 
was convinced that it was especially the idea of continuity that had been undermined by 
recent developments. This idea had also made its way into economics, in particular in terms 
of the assumption of the contiguity of any pair of ‘adjacent’ methods of production in the 
production function of a commodity. Alfred Marshall had expressed the idea of continuity 
in the motto of his Principles of Economics as ‘Natura non facit saltum’. To Sraffa, demand 
and supply curves involved a false analogy with Newtonian mechanics. (Kurz and Salvadori, 
2005, p. 85)
Sraffa’s reading of quantum theory may have in%uenced his scepticism concerning 
the application of Newtonian mechanics. But Sraffa does not argue that economics 
should simply follow the ‘latest trend’ in physics and criticise Newtonian analogies 
only because it was challenged within physics by Schrödinger’s quantum theory. In fact, 
Sraffa also writes, comparing Marshall and Hobson on the one hand, and Newton and 
Schrodinger on the other:
What Newton had proved about physics was of course quite irrelevant to Economics, and 
Marshall must have been short of good arguments to use such an unfair trick. At the present 
day this would not be possible, as witness {Schrodinger}. It should be added that {Schrodinger} 
cannot be used to demolish {marginal theory} any more than Newton could prop it—except to 
the extent that it is in fact supported by the prestige appeal—which may well be large. (Sraffa, 
D3/12/42/10, sixth proposition)
In any case, we can see that not only Sraffa found Marshall’s use of Newton’s method 
deeply problematic, as he was also very aware of the methodological justi#cation that 
Marshall had provided for it, grounded on Newton’s principle of continuity. Sraffa is 
aware of Marshall’s methodology and criticises the very foundations of it. To under-
stand this we must now address Sraffa’s discussion of the principle of continuity in 
more detail.
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Sraffa, Marshall and the principle of continuity  Page 9 of 20
5. Sraffa’s critique of the principle of continuity
Sraffa (D3/12/11/40) writes that the period of time is just the interval between cause 
and effect—it is a de#nite not an arbitrary length—while adding that time is thus dis-
continuous. In yet another note, Sraffa (D3/12/11/62) explains that time is an objective 
duration, not an arbitrary segment of the continuous. The following note, written by 
Sraffa on 20 August 1963, further clari#es his own conception of continuity:
It is possible for a point to move continuously on a line. It is possible for a line to move continu-
ously on a surface. But, is it possible for a point to move continuously on a surface? [Obviously, 
continuous motion means ‘covering part of surface’] then No. Marginalism is based on experi-
ments of the #rst type (linear) and then illegitimately extended to second (surface = n ‘fac-
tors’). For instance, indifference curves are traced by continuous imaginary experiments with 
two goods: but could an indifference curve be drawn between 3 goods (not to speak of more). 
(Sraffa, D3/12/42/10, original emphasis)
This notion of continuity is one in which continuity entails a connection between differ-
ent points or lines, where the connection implies covering all the relevant dimensions. 
For example, when a point, which has no dimension, moves over a (unidimensional) 
line it covers all the dimensions of the line, because there is only one dimension to be 
covered; thus there is continuity in this movement in Sraffa’s sense, because all the 
dimensions at play (in this case one dimension) are covered—curiously, this de#nition 
of continuity closely follows Newton’s own de#nition of a line, which Newton takes to 
be the result of the continuous movement of a point, which creates the line through its 
continuous movement (see Guicciardini, 2009, for a discussion).
Likewise, when a line moves over a two-dimensional surface, it covers all the dimen-
sions of the two-dimensional surface. However, when a point moves over a two-dimen-
sional surface, the line created by this movement (or along which this movement takes 
place, if we take the dimension to pre-exist the movement rather than being created by 
the movement, as Newton would argue) is insuf#cient to cover the two-dimensional 
surface. Quite the contrary, the unidimensional line that results from this movement 
occupies in fact no space in the two-dimensional surface. Thus, there is no continuity 
in the sense Sraffa is using the word, i.e. in the sense of occupying or covering all the 
existing dimensions.
Within this conception of continuity, Sraffa then argues, in the note reproduced above, 
that an indifference curve cannot be drawn for three goods or more, but only for two 
goods. It is, however, dif#cult to see how this necessarily follows from Sraffa’s notion of 
continuity. In fact, six days after writing the note on continuity above, and its implica-
tions for drawing indifference curves, Sraffa adds the following on 26 August 1963:
The above goes too far, perhaps. It is probably possible mathematically to construct an indiffer-
ence curve for ‘n’ factors. Yet the substance of the argument holds. (Sraffa, D3/12/42/10)
The substance of the argument is that we cannot analyse only two variables, as if the 
others were constant, since even if we assume other variables to remain constant, there 
is still a different proportion between the variable that changed and the others that did 
not. So we must take all relevant variables into account. Sraffa (D3/12/42/10) draws 
the implications of this issue for the marginalist framework, noting how ‘different pro-
portions, between factors, when one factor changes and others remain constant makes 
marginal product meaningless’. Sraffa also draws the implications of this critique for 
the neoclassical framework of Marshall and Pigou:
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Page 10 of 20  N. O. Martins
The idea is that the process of change can be reduced to a continuous process … {Marshall} 
is constantly on the defensive against objections to continuity based on facts [example Pigou]. 
This is not the basis on which this is based. That can be taken for granted in detail, wherever it 
is possible. It is against the logical possibility of the type of continuity assumed. That type is only 
possible with two factors. (Sraffa, D3/12/42/12, original emphasis)
Effectively, if there were more than two factors (or variables), one would have to take 
all the variables into consideration, since a change in one of them, even when others 
remain constant, changes the proportions between them. Thus, Sraffa concludes that 
Marshall’s method, and the type of continuity it assumes, is only possible when the two 
variables being analysed are in fact the only two variables that exist, but not when there 
are other variables being (wrongly) ignored, and assumed to be constant, as Marshall 
assumes.
The role that continuity plays in this regard can perhaps be best understood when 
Sraffa addresses the role of time. While the example provided above is a geometrical 
one, in which Sraffa addresses the issue of continuity in terms of space, in another note 
Sraffa (D3/12/13/1) addresses the issue of continuity while dealing with time. Sraffa 
suggests that we study not a continuous movement through time (as Marshall does), 
but rather look at an instantaneous photograph of the economy, i.e. at how the economy 
appears in a given moment of time:
This notion of time is important: it really substitutes «instantaneous photographs» as opposed to 
ordinary time. It is only a part of ordinary time, it has only some of its connotations: it includes 
events, also different events, but not change of events. It enables us to compare two simultane-
ous, but not instantaneous, events, just as if they were «things».
It is, in effect, equivalent to the physicists’ dt (as understood by Russell (Outline of Phil., 
p. 122))—a time in which effects follow causes, but so closely that there is no room either for 
dispersion or for entering of foreign in%uences: dt does this by differentiation (making time so 
short as actually to leave no room for change in circumstances: the cause and effect are perfectly 
contiguous—nothing happens in between)—our «time» does this by «assuming» away all changes 
(i.e. «ceteris paribus»? no: by positing the problem in the form of #nding the conditions of repeti-
tion inde#nitely, or even once).
This conception of time enables us to take into account, not only stocks (as the instantaneous 
view does) but also steady or cyclical #ows (which that does not), while still using the geometrical 
model. (Sraffa, D3/12/13/1(3), original emphasis)
Here we #nd the essence of Sraffa’s methodology: rather than assuming away all 
changes as Marshall does in the pound of ceteris paribus, we should rather describe the 
conditions of repetition (or reproduction) of the economic process. Marshall’s method 
consists of making the period of time short enough so that nothing happens between 
a given cause and its effect, and so there is continuity between them (this is, of course, 
Newton’s method of in#nitesimal calculus, in which the time interval is in#nitesimally 
small). To achieve this only two variables are considered at each time and a causal 
line can be drawn between those two contiguous events while forgetting all the other 
dimensions. But Sraffa writes, criticising this conception:
We are not bound to have only two variables at a time, we can consider them all simultaneously. 
(Sraffa, D3/12/42/35, original emphasis)
And the method for analysing all variables simultaneously consists of the analysis of 
the conditions of repetition (or reproduction) of the economic process in its total-
ity, which is what Sraffa (1960) provides in his Production of Commodities by Means of 
Commodities. Sraffa’s method is an analysis of what is presupposed in this continuous 
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Sraffa, Marshall and the principle of continuity  Page 11 of 20
repetition (or reproduction) of a multidimensional economic process, while taking into 
account all the relevant variables simultaneously.
This is why no assumptions are made concerning returns to scale in Sraffa’s (1960) 
book. For as Sraffa (1960, p. v) writes, he does not consider any changes in output 
and so no question arises as to whether we are in the presence of constant returns to 
scale or of any other returns to scale (increasing or decreasing). Sraffa does, however, 
consider changes in distribution, showing the inconsistency of the marginalist analysis 
of distribution. In fact Sraffa also discusses this issue in his unpublished manuscripts 
and argues that by following the principle of continuity, we would be led to different 
results from the ones reached by Marshall:
But if the number of the means of production is more than two, most of the resulting positions, 
however close to the original, actual, one, will be impossible. For, in correspondence, with a 
rise (or fall) however small of r, the most pro#table position will in general involve a change 
(some up and some down) in many or all the quantities of means of production. And there is 
no ground for supposing that the change in ‘others’ is negligible compared with the change in 
the chosen one.
Thus, as a result of assuming perfect continuity, we get in general as a result discontinuity or 
rather: even though all quantities may move continuously (i.e. go through all the intermediate 
positions) it will never be possible to change one, however small the increment, while keeping 
the others constant. (Sraffa, D3/12/42)
So even if we admit continuity, for the sake of argument, the existence of more 
than two variables, and the interconnections between them, brings in discontinuity. 
Interestingly, both Marshall’s and Sraffa’s methods can be seen as responses to the 
problem of interconnectedness. Marshall’s solution is to take the interval of time to be 
so short that only two events (the cause and the effect) occur and can thus be analysed 
in isolation, as contiguous events. Sraffa’s method, on the other hand, is not to isolate a 
given part of the whole, but rather to study the conditions for the permanent reproduc-
tion of the whole, which are elaborated in the Production of Commodities.
6. Sraffa and the critique of marginalism
In Production of Commodities, Sraffa considers all the variables that are essential to for-
mulate the overall structure of the economic system. Sraffa writes the following in the 
beginning of Production of Commodities:
It is … a peculiar feature of the set of propositions now published that, although they do not 
enter into any discussion of the marginal theory of value and distribution, they have nevertheless 
been designed to serve as the basis for a critique of that theory. (Sraffa, 1960, p. vi)
Production of Commodities is in fact subtitled as being a ‘Prelude to a Critique of 
Economic Theory’. This means that it is not a critique, but contains only the basic 
elements for others to undertake such a critique. Production of Commodities provides a 
basic framework, which contains not only the key elements for a critique of margin-
alism but also the key elements to explain the economic process of production (and 
reproduction). As Garegnani (1998) argues, it provides a ‘core’, at the level of ‘pure 
theory’, to use Luigi Pasinetti’s (2005) expression, which must be supplemented by 
further ‘institutional analysis’ or, as Garegnani (1998, p. 419) writes, by ‘what Marshall 
used to call “speci#c experience” (1920, p. 637)’—although, at least after chapter 1, 
the book is already presupposing a capitalist economy.
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Page 12 of 20  N. O. Martins
Such an institutional analysis would require some understanding of human behav-
iour. On this topic we #nd Sraffa defending a view that is again opposed to neoclassical 
economics. While the latter came to portray the human agent as an optimiser respond-
ing to subjective preferences (unlike Marshall himself, who had a much more realist 
conception of the human agent), Sraffa stresses that human beings are creatures of 
habit:
man learns from experience, or at any rate is changed by it, forms and transforms habits, etc 
(This is recognized by Marshall … but he does not draw the inevitable conclusion that what he 
draws are historical, not equilibrium, diagrams). (Sraffa, D3/12/42/11)
One may wonder whether the emphasis on equilibrium rather than on history comes 
from Marshall himself, as Sraffa seems to imply, or from Marshall’s followers such as 
Pigou, as Groenewegen (1982, pp. 13–14) argues. Probably Sraffa is reading Marshall 
too much through Pigou here, as in other cases. As Neil Hart (2004, p. 189) writes, ‘A. 
C. Pigou and his followers set about the task of re#ning Marshall’s equilibrium theory 
in such a way that history became divorced from economic analysis.’
Nevertheless, Sraffa is certainly right to note that Marshall had a realist concep-
tion of the human agent and that he did not develop the implications of the latter for 
his economic diagrams. Sraffa draws the implication of his conception of the human 
agent, as in%uenced by the behaviour of others, for Marshall’s approach:
Besides, for {supply and demand} curves, external {circumstances} include the behaviour of 
our individuals: for the action of an individual is not independent of others, and individual 
demand (or supply) curves cannot be aggregated into a collective curve (as is well-known for 
supply curves, {and} as Pigou as acknowledged at least for some cases of demand). (Sraffa, 
D3/12/42/11)
We must, however, bear in mind that Sraffa’s point is not that marginalism does not 
provide the right conclusions at many instances, but rather that it does so through an 
inconsistent method. Sraffa writes:
The marginal method is an unwarranted extension of the commonsense proposition that an 
employer will not keep a workman if by sacking him he saves more from his wages than he 
loses in his product—or take one more man if he can gain thereby: the same of course applies 
to remit of any means of production. Where marginalism goes astray is in (falsely) assuming 
further, A) that it is a method (a route) for reaching the most economic position (i.e. equi-
librium)—whereas it is at best (i.e. when practicable) a means of ascertaining whether one is 
there or not, and also if one is in the neighbourhood of getting precisely there (…) B) that it 
has general applicability, whereas in fact it only applies exceptionally (in cases where partial 
change is feasible, where there is independence, the whole is not affected). It must not be 
thought that in rejecting the marginal principle, one rejects this commonsense proposition. 
(Sraffa, D3/12/42/9)
The idea that ‘the whole is not affected’ is in fact related to the problem of intercon-
nectedness. But a key difference between Marshall and Sraffa is that Sraffa does not 
consider all conceivable variables simultaneously, as Marshall thought one would have 
to. Marshall was led to a partial equilibrium analysis after realising that such a task 
would be impossible.
In earlier writings Sraffa discusses the problem of the selection of the variables to be 
included, while nevertheless addressing still the totality of the economic system. The 
strategy that Sraffa follows is to look at objective data. Thus, in a note dated October 
1929, Sraffa writes:
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Sraffa, Marshall and the principle of continuity  Page 13 of 20
Clearly, we must reduce all the data to things that actually happen, excluding inexistent possi-
bilities. Only such things are measurable, and can enter the theory as «unknowns» or «constants»; 
and in reality, only really happening things can be real causes and determine effects. (Sraffa, 
D3/12/13/1(2), original emphasis)
Here we #nd a summary of Sraffa’s objectivist approach, where the variables to be con-
sidered are not all the conceivable variables, objective and subjective (as in Marshall’s 
approach), but only objective facts, in which all other factors will become manifest. 
Sraffa distinguishes between three groups of quantities:
1) Those which cannot possibly be measured … e.g. {marginal} utility and sacri#ce
2) … quantities which can be, and in fact are, statistically measured. These quantities have an 
objective, independent existence at every or some instant of the natural (i.e. not interfered with 
by the experiments) process of production and distribution … such are quantities of various 
materials used or produced, of lands, quantities of labour (?), lengths of periods (?), etc. These 
are the only quantities which must enter as constants in economic theory, i.e., which can be 
assumed to be «known» or «given». (The «extensive» theory of rent, and the labour theory of value 
only assume this kind of knowledge).
3) Finally, there is the class of quantities which form the basis of Marshall’s theory (or, rather, 
of Pareto’s), such as demand and supply curves, marginal productivities (i.e. rate of growth 
of total), indifference curves, etc. Here the constant quantities have no names—they are the 
parameters of curves … they are alternatives, only one of which can exist in any one moment, not 
during the recurrent steady state process of production or consumption. (Sraffa, D3/12/13/2, 
original emphasis)
Sraffa grounds his theory on the second group of quantities, i.e. those that can be 
statistically measured and have an objective and independent existence, contrarily to 
Marshall, who adopts the third group of quantities as the basis for his theory. Sraffa 
(D3/12/42) argues that Marshall’s supply-and-demand curves do not exist (nor their 
parameters, which are not objective constants) and are a false analogy with mechanics, 
using mechanical concepts such as ‘elasticity’.
Sraffa’s critique of marginalism extends not just to Marshall’s neoclassical approach, 
but also to other forms of marginalism, such as Austrian economics. Thus, in the 
unpublished paper ‘Margins and Margins’, Sraffa notes that the margin does not 
exist and that although Bortkiewicz criticises Eugene Böhm-Bawerk for the use of 
non-existent counterfactuals, Bortkiewicz does not realise that the work of Böhm-
Bawerk is a particular case of marginalism, and indeed Sraffa notes that Bortkiewicz 
himself accepts marginalism. The marginalist system is best systematised, according 
to Sraffa (D3/2/46/43), in the work of ‘Wicksteed, the most consistent of marginal-
ists’—on which see Wicksteed (1910)—to whom Sraffa also refers in the preface of 
Production of Commodities in order to distinguish marginalist analysis from the study of 
the differential rent.
The comments made above also clarify why Sraffa chooses the theory of production 
for his critique of marginalism. Sraffa (D3/12/42/9) notes that the right camp to attack 
marginalism is through the theory of production, not through the theory of utility. 
Sraffa writes:
while with utility ‘the consumer is always right’—there is no other, independent, check, with 
production output can be measured independently, and can be found not to be so. (Sraffa, 
D3/12/42/9)
That is, in the theory of production we can compare the marginalist approach with an 
objective theory that shows its faults—a theory that Sraffa (1960) provides for such 
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Page 14 of 20  N. O. Martins
a purpose, as he explicitly acknowledges in Production of Commodities—while in the 
theory of utility there is no objective basis for us to criticise marginalism.
A central aspect in this context, for Sraffa, concerns the achievement of an objec-
tive measure of costs, which can be used in the theory of production. In this con-
text Sraffa criticises Marshall’s notion of costs, which includes subjective elements. 
Marshall (1920) criticised Marx and Rodbertus for attributing all the value to labour. 
For Marshall, all human sacri"ces or efforts, objective or subjective, are a source of 
value. This means that, for Marshall, it is not only the labour of the worker, but also the 
waiting from the capitalist who invests that constitutes the real cost. Thus, both labour 
and capital are entitled to part of the produce, depending on their relative contribu-
tions, since the waiting of the investor is also a sacri"ce.
However, Sraffa (D3/12/11/59) writes that the notion of ‘comparative cost’ is unin-
telligible unless applied to ‘physical cost and natural value’, since the subjective aspects 
like ‘sacri#ces’, mentioned by Marshall, are not comparable. Sraffa traces the evolu-
tion towards Marshall’s approach, from the idea of ‘cost’, central to classical political 
economy, to the notion of ‘sacri#ce’, essential to marginalism:
A. Smith {and} Ricardo {and} Marx indeed began to corrupt the old idea of cost—from food to 
labour. But their notion was still near enough to be in many cases equivalent. The decomposition 
went on at a terrible speed from 1820 to 1870: Senior’s abstinence and Mill’s mess of the whole 
thing. Cairnes brought it to the #nal stage «sacri#ce» (did Marshall take it from Cairnes? See his 
Princ. Note p. 339, seems not). (Sraffa, D3/12/4/2)
This process of decomposition of Petty’s conception of cost continued with the mar-
ginalist revolution, where, Sraffa (D3/12/4/2) writes, there was a shift ‘from physical to 
psychical processes: Jevons, Menger, Walras’. Sraffa adds that:
This has meant the destruction of the classical {political economy} and the substitution of it, 
under the old name of the calculus of pleasure and pain (Hedonistic). (Sraffa, D3/12/4/2)
Classical political economy, for Sraffa, was a project outlined clearly in the writ-
ings of Petty, who had an objective conception of cost. This notion of cost must not 
include subjective elements. Thus, Sraffa (D3/12/42/39) notes that while for Hobson 
an expense for moral incentives is part of the necessary cost (which are both physical 
and moral), for Sraffa himself expenses for moral incentives are part of the surplus but 
not part of the costs, which are only physical. With Smith, Ricardo and Marx we #nd 
a development of classical political economy that leads to fruitful results, but contains 
a conception of cost that must be clari#ed.
7. Metaphysics and methodology
For Sraffa, an important reason why marginalism became successful was the need 
to #nd an alternative to Marx’s development of classical political economy. Thus, 
Garegnani (2005, p. 457) writes that for Sraffa the ‘“immediate and simultaneous suc-
cess” of the utility-based theory of value of Jevons, Menger and Walras’ was a response 
to Marx, who showed how ‘Classical P[olitical] E[economy], with its surplus to be 
arbitrarily divided leads straight to Socialism’ (Sraffa, as cited in Garegnani, 2005, 
p. 489). But the interpretation of Marx in Britain is not an easy task, given its underly-
ing metaphysics:
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Sraffa, Marshall and the principle of continuity  Page 15 of 20
This would be simply a translation of Marx into English, from the forms of Hegelian meta-
physics to the forms of Hume’s metaphysics (Keynes to-day, 26 XI. 27 has clearly outlined the 
divorce between English and Continental thought: the #rst descending from Descartes [and] 
Hobbes, the two original geniuses, to Locke, Hutcheson and ultimately Hume, the second 
from Spinoza (did he say that of S.?) from Kant to Hegel: they always remained foreign to one 
another). (Sraffa, D3/12/4/15)
For Sraffa, understanding the underlying metaphysics of a theory is essential for its 
proper use. Sraffa writes, concerning metaphysics, that:
By metaphysics here I mean, I suppose, the emotions that are associated with our terminology 
and frames (schemi mentali)—that is, what is absolutely necessary to make the theory living, 
capable of assimilation and at all intelligible. (Sraffa, D3/12/4/15)
Thus, for Sraffa every theory has an implicit metaphysics, which must be understood 
if we are to understand the theory. Sraffa concludes this discussion on metaphysics 
noting how:
Our metaphysics is in fact embodied in our technique; the danger lies in this, that when we have 
succeeded in thoroughly mastering a technique, we are very liable to be mastered by her. (Sraffa, 
D3/12/4/15)
The relation between methodology and metaphysics is thus essential to our under-
standing of the appropriateness of a given method. The emphasis that Sraffa puts on 
these methodological aspects cannot be stressed enough. As Annalisa Rosselli (2005, 
p.  405) notes, Sraffa writes, in a letter to Charles Parrish Blitch (dated 6 October 
1975), that ‘in economic theory the conclusions are sometimes less interesting than 
the route by which they are reached’. In fact, in his notes on Sidgwick, Sraffa copies 
the following passages:
Sidgwick, 59: «The importance of seeking the best de#nition» is far greater than the «importance 
of "nding it». (Sraffa, D1/20/3, original emphasis)
That is, the methodological activity of seeking clear concepts and de#nitions is more 
important that the achievement of a de"nite theory. This note is next to another note 
where we see that Sraffa (D1/20/4) was looking precisely at the foundations of the 
theory of value, since the latter is a note on Sidgwick’s discussion of the ‘assumptions 
on which theory of value is generally based’.
The relation between metaphysics and the theory of value is also present in a note 
written in Italian, where Sraffa (D3/12/10/24) quotes a passage by Eduard Zeller on a 
fragment by Heraclitus that can be translated into English as ‘all things are exchanged 
by #re, and #re for all things, as goods for gold and gold for goods’:
But the importance of a comparison must not be exaggerated. The #re substance becomes some-
thing different (?), i.e. it transforms itself, as we will see, in water, land, meteor, but Heraclitus 
supposes (?) always that #re remains hidden in every derived substance, but not in act, as the 
Aristotelians (!) would say, but in power/potentiality. This comparison like all comparisons is not 
the expression of a material identity (?), since, if the substance-#re becomes an absolutely dif-
ferent one, like gold exchanges itself for meat, wood, wine or any other object, it is no more pos-
sible to talk of a universal substance. (Sraffa, D3/12/10/24, as translated in Kurz and Salvadori, 
2010, p. 202)
This passage, with which Sraffa seems to disagree, leads him to consider a description 
of reality in terms of a universal substance.The idea of a universal substance, a hidden 
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Page 16 of 20  N. O. Martins
substance behind material things, underpins the labour theory of value and certainly 
Marx’s interpretation of it. But the idea of an underlying substance is essential not only 
to the theory of value, but also to our metaphysics.
For example, it is because a %uid and liquid substance can be seen as a whole that 
adapts itself to (or becomes individualised in) many forms that led Thales to claim 
that water was the primordial substance, the one from which many individual forms 
spring—Heraclitus’ claim that "re is the universal substance is part of the subsequent 
discussion that took place after Thales. Thus, when Sraffa (D3/12/42/57) writes that 
Marshall assumes ‘%uidity’, ‘liquid capital’, we can see how the idea of %uidity is part of 
Marshall’s conception that everything is interrelated and thus nothing is ‘rigid’ in the 
sense of being unaffected by changes somewhere in the overall system.
Stephen Pratten (1998) argues that Marshall’s dif#culties spring from the incon-
sistency between this underlying ontology presupposed by Marshall (which assumes a 
dynamic and interconnected reality, as is apparent when he points towards evolution-
ary biology) and the statical method he employs. This inconsistency is also related to 
the tension between history and equilibrium in Marshall—on which see Hart (2004), 
but see George Shackle (1965) for an alternative assessment according to which 
Marshall did succeed in creating unity between the conceptions of equilibrium and 
of evolution.
Marshall’s approach, like Sraffa’s, is an attempt to solve the problem of interconnect-
edness, a problem that was already central for pre-Socratic philosophers such as Thales 
and Heraclitus, amongst many others, and is also a key element of what may be termed 
as the Cambridge economic tradition, as Harcourt (2003) and Pasinetti (2005) argue. 
To address this problem, Marshall, following Newton, focuses on continuous movement 
and takes continuity to be an essential ontological (or metaphysical) constituent of 
reality. Remember that Newton argues that even a line is created by the continuous 
movement of a point.
Sraffa, in contrast, suggests that we look at an ‘instantaneous photograph’, in which 
the dynamic elements manifest themselves (just like the subjective elements will also 
manifest themselves in the objective elements that Sraffa addresses). To use a geomet-
rical analogy, while Marshall, following Newton, would focus on the activity of drawing 
a line, Sraffa would look at what the line looks like at a given instant.
Sraffa’s approach is not a new solution to the problem of interconnectedness and 
the metaphysics (or ontology) underlying this solution is essential to understand 
it. Heraclitus argued that every element is connected to another element, creating 
a permanent %ow and interaction, which is constitutive of the world. Hence, for 
Heraclitus the primordial element is #re (as noted above when addressing Sraffa’s 
discussion of Heraclitus’ fragment), the constant transformation of entities. But 
this leaves us with the problem of how can we achieve knowledge of a reality that 
changes before we even have the chance of grasping it—a problem Marshall and 
Sraffa also faced.
Plato’s solution to Heraclitus’ problem was that what our knowledge grasps are 
timeless ideas, which materialise themselves in instants of the constant %ow of matter. 
For Plato only the geometer can enter the academy Plato founded (hence the famous 
inscription at its entrance), because only the geometer can see the eternal (or time-
less) forms already drawn (in the intelligible world), which materialise themselves in 
events (in the sensible world). The meaning of the world eternal can indeed be taken 
to be timelessness. As Ludwig Wittgenstein, who engaged in numerous philosophical 
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discussions with Sraffa—on which see John Davis (1988, 2002) or Amartya Sen 
(2003)—wrote in his Tractatus:
If we take eternity to mean not in#nite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life 
belongs to those who live in the present. (Wittgenstein, 1921, 6.4311)
This is an idea present in Boethius’ book, The Consolation of Philosophy, and a central 
element of the Platonist tradition, which was once dominant in Cambridge (at least 
since the Cambridge Platonists) and in%uenced authors such as Whitehead, Moore and 
Keynes. We have, however, no evidence of the putative in%uence of Platonism on Sraffa.
But the underlying metaphysics at stake here (Platonist or other) is essential to 
understand Sraffa’s theory, or any theory, as Sraffa himself argues. If we take eternity 
to mean an ‘in#nite temporal duration’ (to use Wittgenstein’s expression) and interpret 
Sraffa’s theory in those terms, we will be led to interpret it as a theory of what will 
happen with enough (inde#nite or in#nite), time. As Harcourt (1981, p. 258) explains, 
this was ‘Joan Robinson’s interpretation of Sraffa’s system’, in which Sraffa’s system 
was one in which we have ‘already reached the end of Marshall’s long period’. But as 
Harcourt also notes, Joan Robinson changed this interpretation and she writes later of 
Sraffa’s system:
It does not represent a stationary state of an equilibrium position. It is simply the position that 
has been reached, ‘today’, as a result of accumulation of stocks and of technical knowledge over 
the past history. (Robinson, 1985, p. 164)
That is, Joan Robinson came to see Sraffa’s system in terms of an ‘instantaneous pho-
tograph’ of the economy, taking into account what has been reached today, in a present 
that nevertheless re%ects the effect of historical time.
This issue divides many prominent interpreters of Sraffa. For example, Alessandro 
Roncaglia, who provides a very clear explanation of Sraffa’s discussion of ‘instantane-
ous photographs’, criticises Garegnani for interpreting Sraffa’s system in terms of a 
long-period position, arguing that ‘Sraffa’s notion of production prices is a re#nement 
of the classical (Petty, Smith, Ricardo) notion of natural prices expressing the condi-
tions of reproduction of the economy at a moment in time’ (Roncaglia, 2010, p. 174).
This is the interpretation we reach if we think not of an ‘in#nite temporal duration’ 
but rather in terms of ‘timelessness’. However, it is also true that for Sraffa each ‘time-
less’ position (each ‘instantaneous photograph’) must contain the conditions of pos-
sibility for its permanent (or ‘in#nite’ or ‘eternal’) repetition. Thus, it is also consistent 
with what Garegnani calls a long-period position, which need not mean a stationary 
position, but rather a normal position that contains the conditions of possibility for its 
permanent repetition. In fact, I had the opportunity to discuss this issue with the late 
Professor Garegnani, who replied to me the following:
As for the question of interpreting Sraffa in terms of ‘long period analysis’ (I now prefer to speak 
of ‘normal prices’ or ‘normal position’ to avoid the endless present confusions between ‘long 
period’ and ‘stationarity’), I can understand your perplexities in relating that with the ‘instan-
taneous photograph’ of some Sraffa manuscripts. I believe however that the latter phrases take 
care essentially of quite a distinct question: Sraffa’s early attempts to come to terms with his 
own unexpected results of a determination of prices with no (neoclassical) demand and supply 
functions—and later, may be, an attempt to present those results avoiding as much as possible 
the scandal of prices which can be determined without D&S. I had, I believe, tried to argue this 
case in a paragraph (par. 13 I see) on an article of mine on Sraffa’s “Turning Point”. (Garegnani, 
excerpt from email sent to author on 16 May 2011)
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The article in case is Garegnani (2005), where a most convincing case is made con-
cerning Sraffa’s change of interpretation of the theory of value in 1927, which led to 
a different view of classical political economy, which contrasts with the Marshallian 
supply-and-demand analysis. The key to understand this problem lies in a topic that, 
according to Sraffa, is essential to interpret any theory: its underlying metaphysics 
or, as it is usually phrased today, its presupposed ontology. The ontology of classical 
political economy, as interpreted by Sraffa, presupposes the reproduction of a whole 
and so the proper method consists of studying the conditions for the reproduction of 
the whole, rather than the analysis of how supply and demand mutually determine the 
prices and quantities of a part of the whole.
8. Concluding remarks
Marshall argues that if the interval of time is suf#ciently short, we can focus only on 
direct effects, assuming indirect effects to be negligible—the pound of ceteris paribus. 
However, Sraffa #nds this methodology insuf#cient for several reasons. Sraffa argues 
that for everything else to remain constant when two variables interact, one being the 
cause of the other, we would have to assume the interval of time to be small enough 
so that nothing happens between them (between cause and effect). This occurs only in 
an in#nitely small interval of time, as was presupposed in the analysis of Leibniz and 
Newton. But, as Sraffa argues, Newton’s analysis is irrelevant to economics, since in 
economics we are not concerned only with in#nitely small intervals of time.
Sraffa suggests that we solve this problem by focusing not on intervals of time, but 
rather on the overall economy at a given point in time. In so doing we should investi-
gate what the conditions are for permanent repetition or reproduction of the economy 
at a given point in time, or ‘instantaneous photograph’. This is the only way to take 
into account the interconnectedness of reality in a consistent way. But, for Sraffa, the 
elements to include in this ‘instantaneous photograph’ of the overall economic process 
are only objective entities, which can be objectively measured, and not subjective enti-
ties, such as preferences and utility.
A key methodological aspect at stake in Sraffa’s critique and the subsequent devel-
opment of an alternative framework is the critique of Marshall’s principle of continu-
ity. To understand this we must take into account what is the underlying metaphysics 
(or ontology) presupposed in Marshall’s conception of continuity and also the under-
lying metaphysics (or ontology) presupposed in Sraffa’s conception of continuity. As 
Sraffa writes, the underlying metaphysics of a theory is essential to understand it and 
this is also true, of course, of the interpretation of Sraffa’s own theory.
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